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Procedural Steps Addressing Sexual and Gender-based Violence: the Legacy of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and its Application in the Special
Court for Sierra Leone
Valerie Oosterveld1
Abstract (100 words):
This paper examines certain procedural strategies adopted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to encourage and support victims of, and
witnesses to, sexual and gender-based violence and traces their application in the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. First, the paper explores specific methods used to
protect the identity of victims and witnesses. Second, this paper considers steps
taken by the ICTR to provide courtroom support to victims and witnesses. Finally,
this paper surveys evidentiary approaches meant to reduce the retraumatization of
sexual violence victims. The ICTR indeed has a legacy in these respects,
somewhat positive and somewhat flawed.
Keywords:
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, rape, sexual violence, Rule 92bis,
Rule 96
Paper:
The substantive jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
on the topic of sexual and gender-based violence has been simultaneously praised and
critiqued,2 but the tribunal‟s procedural contributions in this area largely tend to be
overlooked. This paper examines the procedural strategies adopted by the ICTR to
encourage and support victims of, and witnesses to, sexual violence during the 1994
genocide. The discussion is divided into three parts. First, the paper explores specific
methods used to protect the identity of victims and witnesses, when deemed necessary to
avoid reprisals and stigmatization. These techniques included assigning pseudonyms,
using face and voice distortion on video feeds outside of the courtroom, redacting
identifying information from the public record, and permitting evidence to be presented
1
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E.g. see L. Bianchi, „The Prosecution of Rape and Sexual Violence: Lessons from Prosecutions at the
ICTR‟, in A. de Brouwer et al. (eds.), Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary
Approaches (2013), 123; D. Buss, „Learning our Lessons? The Rwanda Tribunal Record on Prosecuting
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in camera. Second, this paper considers steps taken by the ICTR to provide courtroom
support to victims and witnesses, for example by permitting breaks as needed for victims,
allowing support persons to be present, and accepting written evidence when witnesses
felt that they could not verbalize the words to describe their rape. Finally, this paper
surveys evidentiary approaches meant to reduce the retraumatization of sexual violence
victims, such as admission of written statements, consideration of evidence from nonvictim sources, acceptance of victim evidence without a requirement of corroboration,
restrictions on the accused‟s use of the defence of consent, and exclusion of evidence of
prior sexual conduct of the victim.3
In examining these procedural innovations, the paper also contemplates whether and how
the procedural legacy of the ICTR has influenced a subsequently-created tribunal, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). When the SCSL was created, it was envisaged
that the procedural experience of the ICTR would inform the operations of the SCSL.4
This is why the SCSL‟s Statute states that „[t]he Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda obtaining at the time of the establishment of
the Special Court shall be applicable mutatis mutandis to the conduct of the legal
proceedings before the Special Court‟.5 The ICTR was founded in 1994 and the SCSL in
2002, so the ICTR‟s practice, as a tribunal on the same continent, was meant to facilitate
the SCSL in quickly establishing itself. That said, the SCSL‟s Statute also permitted
deviation from the ICTR‟s procedures: „The judges of the Special Court as a whole may
amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or adopt additional rules where the
applicable Rules do not, or do not adequately, provide for a specific situation.‟6 This
transfer of procedural experience from one international criminal tribunal to another is a
key aspect of the ICTR‟s legacy, and yet that legacy changes as other tribunals adapt the
ICTR‟s approaches to their particular situations.
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Given space constraints, the paper only focuses on certain procedural legacies. There are many other parts
of the ICTR‟s legacy, both positive and negative, that are not explored in this paper, but which deserve
greater attention, such as the manner in which victims of and witnesses to sexual and gender-based violence
have been dealt with during investigations in Rwanda, how they have and have not been adequately
prepared for their courtroom experience at the seat of the court, and whether the ICTR has kept victims and
witnesses adequately informed after their courtroom appearance. See Bianchi, supra note 2, at 131-134 for
an explanation of lessons learned from ineffective interactions with rape victims during prosecution
investigations. See also Nowrojee, supra note 2, at 4, 12-13, and 20-25 regarding poor investigations, lack
of adequate preparation or explanation of the courtroom experience and lack of follow-up and protection
after victims provide testimony.
4
Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc.
S/2000/915 (2000), at para. 20. See also paras. 64-65, in which both the ICTR and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia were expected to share knowledge and expertise with the
SCSL on a variety of matters, including on „adopting and formulating Rules of Procedure based on
experience acquired in the practice of both Tribunals‟ (para. 65).
5
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone at Article 14(1), annexed to the 2002 Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 UNTS 138.
6
Ibid., at Article 14(2).
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1. Protecting the Identity of Victims of and Witnesses to Sexual and GenderBased Violence in the Courtroom
While sexual and gender-based violence – rape in particular - was widespread during the
Rwandan genocide,7 many victims of this violence did not wish to testify openly at the
ICTR and therefore requested that their identity be concealed from the public.8 Again,
while sexual and gender-based violence - such as rape, sexual slavery and forced
marriage – was pervasive in the Sierra Leone civil war, many victims and witnesses
appearing before the SCSL were similarly concerned about protecting their identities.9
However, many were willing to reveal the details of their experiences before an
international tribunal, as long as their names and other identifying information were kept
from the public.10 The victims rationally feared the potential negative short- and longterm consequences for themselves and their families if their identities were revealed.11
Rape is a violation related more to power and violence than to sex, and yet cultural
practices often unfairly place shame on the rape victim rather than the perpetrator, or
consider rape victims as tainted or unmarriageable, creating significant consequences for
victims‟ psychological and economic well-being.12 In other words, the cultural and
familial after-effects of stigmatization due to rape provide a significant disincentive to
women and girls to publicly reveal their identities when discussing their rape before the
tribunals. Given the risks associated with public testimony, the ICTR Trial Chambers

7

R. Degui-Segui, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/68 (1996), at paras. 16-24; Human Rights Watch, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During
the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (1996), 1. Bianchi notes that the estimates of the extent of sexual
and gender-based violence in Rwanda do not capture a number of sexual and gender-based violations:
Bianchi, supra note 2, at 126, note 9.
8
E.g., witness DBE in Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana, Bizimungu, Nzuwonemeye and Sagahutu, Judgment
and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, T.Ch. II, 17 May 2011, paras. 1111-1118.
9
E.g. witness TF1-023 in Prosecutor v. Taylor, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, T.Ch. II, 18 May
2012, paras. 1008-1015 and 1180-1187. Note, however, that there were some victims who chose to have
their names revealed in public, e.g. Akiatu Tholley, ibid., paras. 1000-1007 and 1171-1179.
10
The evidence of the ICTR‟s witness TAP demonstrates this: TAP wished to have her identity protected
from the public, but to unveil her secret (of having been raped by Gacumbitsi during the genocide) in the
courtroom: Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Transcript of 6 August 2003, Case No. ICTR-01-64-T, T.Ch.III, 6
August 2003, page 22 at line 33, page 23 at lines 2-3, page 29 at lines 27-28, and page 32 at lines 18, 29
and 36-37. See a discussion of the motivations in this regard of certain victims in a case at the SCSL:
Michelle Staggs Kelsall and Shanee Stepakoff, „“When We Wanted to Talk About Rape”: Silencing Sexual
Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone‟ (2007) 1 International Journal of Transitional Justice 355,
at 363-373.
11
This was illustrated in the case of witness TA, who indicated to Nowrojee, supra note 2, at 17, that her
identity was not adequately protected, her fiancé found out that she had testified to the ICTR about being
raped, and he refused to marry her: „He said, you went to Arusha and told everyone that you were raped.‟
Nowrojee explains the context: „In a society such as Rwanda, where women are valued highly for their
roles as wives and mothers, witness TA‟s reintegration into society was very much predicated on her
marriageability.‟ The exposure of TA‟s status as a rape victim affected her ability to rebuild her life.
12
An example of this is found in the SCSL‟s judgment in Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao,
Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, T.Ch.I, 2 March 2009, at para. 1349, describing the stigmatization of
female victims of sexual violence: „Victims of sexual violence were ostracized, husbands left their wives,
and daughters and young girls were unable to marry within their community‟.
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permitted the use of a number of protective measures in cases involving sexual violence,
and the SCSL Trial Chambers followed suit.
One of the most common measures used to protect the identity of the victim or witness
was the application of a pseudonym rather than the individual‟s real name. For example,
in the ICTR, pseudonyms were a combination of letters (such as witness DBE), 13 and in
the SCSL, pseudonyms were a combination of letters and numbers such as TF1-023.14
While this has protected the identities of victims and witnesses from the international
public, Nowrojee notes that this has not always the case at the local level, at least in
ICTR cases: the rules of the court require that the names of the individuals testifying for
the prosecution are revealed to the defence in order to respect due process rights of the
accused, but, in certain instances, the defence has presumably leaked these names to
individuals in the victims‟ or witnesses‟ home areas in Rwanda.15 This, unsurprisingly,
has negative consequences, betraying the trust of victims and witnesses in the tribunal
and puts individuals at risk of reprisal and/or stigmatization.16
Another technique used for victim and witness protection in cases involving sexual and
gender-based violence was in camera proceedings. While the general rule is for public
sessions,17 judges and defence counsel at both the ICTR and SCSL tended to accept the
need for entirely closed or mixed open/closed sessions for victims and witnesses
testifying to sexual and gender-based violence.18 For example, witness TAP testified in a
mixed closed/open session in the ICTR‟s Gacumbitsi case, with identifying information
revealed in closed session and information regarding her experience during the genocide
in open session except when it could reveal her identity.19 In both tribunals, if identifying
information was accidentally revealed during open session, it was expunged from the
record. For example, in a case at the SCSL, one protected witness testifying about sexual
and gender-based violence asked for the name of her school to be expunged, as she had
mentioned it in direct evidence but then realized that, since it was a small school,
members of the public might be able to determine her identity.20 The trial judges agreed,
and the Presiding Judge requested the media not to publish the information.21

13

See note 8, supra.
See note 9, supra.
15
Nowrojee, supra note 2, at 22. This is a violation of the rules, but it is difficult to prove that the leak
came from the defence: ibid. at 23.
16
Ibid., at 22-23.
17
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc.
ITR/3/Rev.22 (2013), at Rule 78 [hereinafter ICTR RPE]; Rules of Procedure of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, Rev.14 (2012) at Rule 78 [hereinafter SCSL RPE].
18
This is permitted under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of both tribunals: ibid., at Rules 75
(Measures for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses) and 79 (Closed Sessions).
19
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Transcript of 6 August 2003, supra note 10, at pages 1-64. The SCSL also
used mixed open/closed sessions, for example for witness TF1-189 in Prosecutor v. Taylor, Transcript for
17 September 2008, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, T.Ch.II, 17 September 2008, at page 16480.
20
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Transcript 28 November 2005, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, T.Ch.I,
28 November 2005, at page 28 at line 26-29, and page 29 at 2-7.
21
Ibid., at page 29 at lines 7-16.
14
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Other protective methods used within the tribunals were placement of a screen to shield
the victim, and deployment of face and/or voice distortion of the victim or witness when
that individual‟s testimony was broadcast outside of the courtroom (for example, in the
public gallery or online video feeds).22 These measures are permitted by the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence and are recognized as best practices for international tribunals.23
2. Providing Courtroom Support to Victims of and Witnesses to Sexual and
Gender-Based Violence
Judges in both tribunals have adopted certain courtroom-friendly procedures, such as
giving breaks to victims and witnesses testifying to sexual violence when they felt
distraught or otherwise very stressed.24 Sometimes these breaks occurred quite often – for
example, in one SCSL trial, a witness needed frequent breaks at a particular point when
she switched from testimony of rapes and assaults she had witnessed to a description of
her own rape.25 One can see similar approaches of judges granting regular breaks in this
regard, for example in the Gacumbitsi case in the ICTR.26 Sometimes breaks were not
given for the victim herself, but to accommodate her situation – for example, in the
SCSL, one witness was accommodated with breaks because she had a four month old
baby with her in courthouse.27
Additionally, both tribunals permitted witness support persons to be present in the
courtroom when necessary, to provide views on suitable protective measures, reassurance
to victims and witnesses of sexual and gender-based crimes, and views on when the
individual‟s questioning should be halted.28 For example, in the SCSL‟s Taylor case, the
22

E.g. in the SCSL, witness TF1-023 benefitted from facial distortion on the broadcast video, Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Transcript for 22 October 2008, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, T.Ch.II, 22 October 2008, at pages
18942-18944. In some cases, the person testifying (TF1-028) could be seen, but the microphone
broadcasting the voice of the witness was turned off at specific points: Prosecutor v. Taylor, Transcript for
8 May 2008, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, T.Ch.II, 8 May 2008, at page 9287; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Transcript
of 17 September 2008, supra note 19, at page 16480; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Transcript of 18 September
2008, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, T.Ch.II, 18 September 2008, at page 16544.
23
ICTR and SCSL RPE, supra note 17, at Rule 75(B)(i)(c) and (B)(iii). The use of screens and other
devices to shield the victim‟s identity from the public are mentioned as a best practice in International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Prosecution of Sexual Violence - Best Practices Manual for the
Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from
the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2014) at para. 207
[hereinafter ICTR Best Practices Manual].
24
E.g. witness DBE was granted breaks to compose herself: Prosecutor v. Ndindiliyimana, Bizimungu,
Nzuwonemeye and Sagahutu, Transcript of 30 March 2005, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, T.Ch. II, 30 March
2005, at page 68.
25
E.g. witness TF1-028 was offered frequent breaks to allow her to compose herself: Prosecutor v. Charles
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Transcript of 7 May 2008 at page 9145, 9158, 9211-9212.
26
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Transcript of 6 August 2003, supra note 10, at page 10 at lines 31-32, page 26
at lines 2-13, page 27 at line 4, and page 42 at line 3.
27
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. Transcript of 28 January 2009, SCSL-03-01-T, T.Ch.II, 28 January 2009,
at page 23833.
28
E.g. in the ICTR, the prosecution noted: „At this point we have a representative of WVSS, Witness and
Victim Support Services, who is – who has indicated that it is not appropriate for witnesses to continue
under questioning for extended periods of time without a break, especially when we have a witness who
has given evidence of the nature that she has given [on rape], and who has been under extensive cross-
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Presiding Judge permitted an individual from the Witness and Victims Support Section to
sit at the Registry Bench (near the victim) to support the victim when she was feeling
fragile or vulnerable.29 In that same case, the Presiding Judge permitted the support
person to come closer to the witness, so as to provide support through presence.30
Another method used by both tribunals was to permit witnesses who felt unable to say
what exactly had happened (e.g. to verbalize the act of rape), or who had committed the
rape, to write down the words. Sometimes the written words were read into court by
someone else, and sometimes not. For example, in one case at the SCSL, a protected
witness wrote down, rather than saying, the name of the rebel who committed sexual
violence against her, the name of the rebel commander to whom she was handed over and
the name of a captain with whom she stayed because saying the names in open session
might identify her to the public.31 This struck a good balance between public trial and
witness protection – keeping the session open, but still protecting her identity. In the
ICTR‟s Gacumbitsi trial, witness TAP was asked „when you say “They raped me”, can
you tell us what they did to you?‟.32 She replied „It is very painful, it is hard for me to
say, so with your permission, perhaps I would write it down.‟33 This was permitted, and
her note was read into the record: „They raped me, sticking their penises into my
vagina.‟34 She did the same again when testifying to another rape.35 She explained that
she could not verbalize this because „[t]hings of that nature are not spoken of. Our parents
never taught us to speak like that; it was a taboo‟.36
It should be noted that, despite these procedures, some victims and witnesses did not feel
supported in the courtroom. This often had to do with the manner and length of defence
cross-examination, which was not always adequately controlled, particularly in the
ICTR.37 Nowrojee and de Brower discuss examples of overly aggressive, insensitive,

examination today‟, Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Transcript of 6 August 2003, supra note 10, at page 63 at
lines 26-30. The ICTR has noted that „There should be a continuous needs assessment by a qualified
counselor while the witness is testifying. Witnesses should be offered the opportunity to speak with a
trained counselor or witness support person before and after their testimony': ICTR Best Practices Manual,
supra note 23, at para. 211.
29
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Transcript for 6 May 2008, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, T.Ch.II, 6 May 2008, at page
9126.
30
Ibid., at page 9156. However, when the witness – directly and through the support person - requested to
stop her testimony due to a bad headache and fatigue, the Presiding Judge appeared frustrated, responding:
„you realise that we are now going to waste some time when you could have used the lunch break to tell
them to get you a Panadol?‟, ibid., at pages 9211-9212.
31
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, Transcript of 9 March 2005, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, T.Ch.II,
9 March 2005, at pages 41, 43, and 59. The prosecution explained at page 41: „the fear is that her
identifying names of rebels with whom she was associated with during that period might indeed reveal her
identity, specifically because of the nature of her evidence: she is a victim of sexual violence.‟
32
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Transcript of 6 August 2003, supra note 10, at page 10 at line 5.
33
Ibid., at page 10, line 6.
34
Ibid., at page 10, line 23.
35
Ibid., at page 24 at lines 25-26 and page 25 at line 3.
36
Ibid., at page 11 at lines 12-13.
37
Nowrojee, supra note 2, at 23-24.
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irrelevant and unduly repetitive questioning of ICTR witnesses providing evidence of
sexual violence.38
3. Evidentiary Approaches to Reduce Retraumatization of Victims of Sexual
and Gender-Based Violence
Prosecutors in both tribunals attempted to limit secondary victimization of victims of
sexual and gender-based violence in a number of ways, including seeking admission of
written statements through Rule 92bis of both tribunals‟ Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, seeking judicial notice of facts surrounding sexual and gender-based violence,
tendering evidence from sources other than direct victims, and applying Rule 96 on
evidence in cases of sexual assault.
The ICTR‟s Rule 92bis covers proof of facts other than by oral evidence, and indicates
that „a Trial Chamber may admit, in whole or in part, the evidence of a witness in the
form of a written statement in lieu of oral testimony which goes to proof of a matter other
than the acts and conduct of the accused as charged in the indictment.‟39 This may
include transcripts of evidence given by the witness in other proceedings before the
tribunal, as long as the evidence „goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct
of the accused‟.40 If a written statement is admitted under Rule 92bis, it is subject to the
general requirement of relevance and probative value applicable to all types of evidence
under Rule 89(C).41 Note that the SCSL‟s Rule 92bis is phrased somewhat differently: „a
Chamber may, in lieu of oral testimony, admit as evidence in whole or in part,
information including written statements and transcripts, that do not go to proof of the
acts and conduct of the accused.‟42 The wording of 92bis was altered early in the
tribunal‟s existence to focus on information and to make clear that proof of reliability is
not a condition of admission.43
Both the ICTR and SCSL have made use of Rule 92bis to reduce the oral testimony
required by victims of sexual and gender-based violence. Rule 92bis was used effectively
in the ICTR‟s Karemera et al. case. The Prosecutor initially filed a motion seeking
admission into evidence of evidence of 63 purported rape witnesses and the admission
into evidence of the transcripts of eight purposed rape witnesses in previous ICTR
proceedings in lieu of them testifying orally.44 The Trial Chamber found that, while none
38

Ibid., at 23-24; de Brower, supra note 2, at 272-274.
The Rule contains a list of factors in favour of and against admitting such evidence: ICTR RPE, supra
note 17, at Rule 92bis(A).
40
Ibid., at Rule 92bis(D).
41
Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzizorera, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Admission of
Evidence of Rape and Sexual Assault Pursuant to Rule 92bis of the Rules and Order for Reduction of
Prosecution Witness List, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, T.Ch.III, 11 December 2006, at para. 8 [Hereinafter
Karemera et al., Decision of 11 December 2006].
42
SCSL RPE, supra note 17, at Rule 92bis(A).
43
Prosecutor v. Norman, Kondewa and Fofana, Fofana – Decision on Appeal Against „Decision on
Prosecution‟s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence‟, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR73,
Ap.Ch., 16 May 2005, at para. 26. The tribunal noted that the situation is different in Sierra Leone, in
which a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was operating.
44
Karemera et al., Decision of 11 December 2006, supra note 41, at para. 3.
39
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of the sexual violence was alleged to have been physically perpetrated by any of the
accused in this case, the evidence was being put forward to show that the rapes were
committed on a widespread and systematic basis by subordinates or co-perpetrators for
whom the accused were responsible and/or with whom they were acting in a joint
criminal enterprise.45 The Trial Chamber found that the „allegations are so pivotal to the
Prosecution‟s case that it would be unfair to the Accused to permit the evidence to be
given in written form without an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.‟46 In a very
different subsequent decision, the Prosecution returned with a request for the admission
of written statements from 16 sexual violence witnesses,47 which was accepted and crossexamination was deemed unnecessary.48 In the SCSL‟s Taylor case, several sexual
violence victims and witnesses had transcripts of their testimonies from previous SCSL
trials admitted under 92bis, though they were subjected to cross-examination.49
In the Karemera et al. case, the Trial Chamber also took judicial notice of adjudicated
facts concerning rapes committed in various prefectures pursuant to Rule 94 of the
ICTR‟s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.50 This alternative method of bringing evidence
of sexual violence proved to be successful: when it was combined with viva voce
evidence and written statements accepted under Rule 92bis, the Trial Chamber found
evidence of the occurrence of rapes in each location.51
Another way in which prosecutors at both tribunals aimed to reduce traumatization of
sexual violence victims was to introduce evidence of sexual violence through other
means such as contemporaneous written reports prepared by the United Nations officials
or nongovernmental organizations.52 Prosecutors at both tribunals also elicited evidence
of sexual violence through individuals who had witnessed, rather than directly
experienced, sexual violence.53
Finally, this paper will consider the legacy of Rule 96 of the ICTR‟s Rules of Procedure
and Evidence. Rule 96 stipulates that:
45

Ibid., at paras. 19-20.
Ibid., at para 20.
47
Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzizorera, Interim Order to the Prosecutor to File the Written
Statements of its Proposed 16 Sexual Violence Witnesses, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, T.Ch.III, 15 August
2007.
48
Ibid., at paras. 24-29.
49
E.g. witnesses TFI-023 and TFI-029 in Prosecutor v. Taylor, Judgment, supra note 9, at paras. 10081015, 1165-1169, and 1180-1187.
50
Karemera et al., Decision of 11 December 2006, supra note 41, at para. 27.
51
Bianchi, supra note 2, at 138; Prosecutor v. Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzizorera, Judgment and
Sentence, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, T.Ch.III, 2 February 2012, at paras. 1338-1424 [hereinafter Karemara
et al., Judgment].
52
E.g. Karemara et al., Judgment, supra note 51, at para. 1414 (report by UN Special Rapporteur DegniSégui); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Judgment, supra note 9, at paras. 6880-6886.
53
E.g. Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Kabiligi, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva, Judgment and Sentence, Case No.
ICTR-98-41-T, T.Ch.I, 18 December 2008, at para. 1908; and Prosecutor Sesay, Kallon and Gbao,
Judgment, supra note 12, at para. 1347. Bianchi recommends this method of bolstering direct victim
evidence of sexual and gender-based violence through evidence from observers and other eyewitnesses, as
well as expert witnesses and medical professionals: Bianchi, supra note 2, at 138-139.
46
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In cases of sexual assault:
(i) Notwithstanding Rule 90(C),54 no corroboration of the victim‟s testimony shall
be required;
(ii) Consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim:
1. (a) Has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear
violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression; or
2. (b) Reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so
subjected, threatened or put in fear.
(iii) Before evidence of the victim's consent is admitted, the accused shall satisfy
the Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible;
(iv) Prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence or as
defence.
The ICTR‟s Rule 96, which is reproduced in the Mechanism for International Criminal
Tribunals‟ Rule 118,55 covers three distinct procedural and evidentiary issues. First, no
corroboration is required for testimony by victims of sexual violence. This is not a rule on
admissibility or exclusion: rather, it concerns reliability and assessment of evidence. 56 In
practice, the ICTR has noted, echoing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia,57 that this rule „accords to the testimony of a victim of sexual assault the
same basis of evaluation of reliability as the testimony of victims of other crimes‟,58
„something which has long been denied‟ at the domestic level.59 While this subrule
simply „treats sexual assault victim testimony on par with that of any other witness‟,60 it
was deemed necessary due to the negative experiences of rape victims under domestic
law in many jurisdictions, in which they often face a higher de facto (and sometimes de
jure) burden of proof than is required for other crimes due to false and discriminatory
cultural assumptions about the unreliability of female testimony regarding rape.61 This

54

ICTR RPE, supra note 17, at Rule 90(C), which relates to testimony of children.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, UN Doc.
MICT/1 (8 June 2012), at Rule 118.
56
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rule makes it clear that the ICTR‟s judges may „rule on the basis of a single testimony
provided such testimony is, in [the Chamber‟s] opinion, relevant and credible.‟62
Second, Rule 96 imposes limitations as to when consent may and may not be allowed as
a defence by the accused.63 Consent may not be raised as a defence if the victim has been
subjected to, threatened with, or had reason to fear violence, duress, detention or
psychological oppression.64 The victim‟s situational context – such as being held in
captivity – disallows the consent defence.65 This is because, in „coercive circumstances,
even an outward appearance of consent by a victim to engage in sexual conduct may, in
reality, be a response given in exchange for survival or amelioration of the coercive
circumstances for the benefit of oneself or another‟: this is a survival strategy and not true
consent.66 Additionally, consent may also not be raised as a defence when the victim
reasonably believed that, if s/he did not submit, another person might be subjected to
violence, threatened or put in fear.67 If the accused does raise a defence of consent, the
tribunal is obliged to hold an in camera hearing to evaluate whether the evidence of the
victim‟s consent is relevant and credible.68 This is a higher admissibility standard than is
required under the general rule, which states: „[a] Chamber may admit any relevant
evidence which it deems to have probative value‟.69 This subrule was considered to be
essential to correct two types of gender-insensitive practices in jurisdictions around the
world: first, some jurisdictions unduly privilege defences of consent by the accused,
thereby imposing a higher standard on evidence of rape.70 Second, judges in some
jurisdictions require proof that the victim resisted rape – a requirement which ignores the
realities of rape, in which many victims do not resist in order to survive as they have been
subjected to or threatened with violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression.71
Third, Rule 96 indicates that information on prior sexual conduct shall never be
admissible as evidence or as part of a defence.72 This portion of Rule 96 reflects the
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influence of domestic rape shield provisions – usually more detailed rules restricting the
introduction of evidence of the victim‟s past sexual behaviour or reputation73 which are
found in various domestic jurisdictions.74 The ICTY explained the rationale behind the
prohibition:
… the prime objective of this provision is to adequately protect the victims from
harassment, embarrassment and humiliation by the presentation of evidence
which relates to past sexual conduct … the value, if any, of information about the
prior sexual conduct of a witness in the context of trials of this nature was
nullified by the potential danger of further causing distress and emotional damage
to the witnesses.75
Apart from the focus on protecting the victim from retraumatization, the prohibition on
this form of evidence also aims to ensure that inaccurate and discriminatory rape myths –
in which lawyers, judges and, at the domestic level, juries assume that past sexual
conduct must indicate consent to the sexual act in question, or „prove‟ mistaken belief by
the accused in the victim‟s consent76 - do not inform the decision-making. Piragoff refers
to this as „obfuscation created by stereotypes‟, as well as bias and prejudice
disingenuously masked as relevance.77 There can be no waiver of this subrule‟s
imperative application.78 While this subrule may result, at least in theory, in the exclusion
of relevant evidence with probative value, Sellers notes that this was an explicit policy
choice.79
Defence counsel in early ICTR cases attempted to challenge Rule 96. For example,
defence counsel in Musema argued that corroboration is required where a witness is
testifying to the occurrence of sexual assault, but this was rejected by the tribunal.80 Rule
96 was also questioned by the defence in Rutaganda.81 Overall, however, the Rule was
not often invoked. In one case at the ICTY, however, the Rule was „skillfully
circumvented‟82 by the accused, Kunarac, who asserted a mistake of fact and argued that
Khan, C. Buisman and C. Gosnell (eds.), Principles of Evidence in International Criminal Justice
(2010),138 at 139.
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he believed that witness DB had consented to sexual intercourse because of her actions.83
Rule 96 was not explicitly asserted or applied;84 rather, the Trial Chamber rejected
Kunarac‟s claim, given the „general context of the existing war-time situation‟, the
„specifically delicate situation of the Muslim girls detained in Partizan or elsewhere in the
Foca region during that time‟ and the threat to the witness from another person close to
Kunarac.85
The SCSL‟s Rule 96 was originally the same as the ICTR‟s, but was changed in 2003.86
Rather than stating that consent shall not be permitted as a defence in certain
circumstances, the Rule indicates when consent cannot be inferred:
In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where appropriate,
apply the following principles:
(i) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim
where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive
environment undermined the victim‟s ability to give voluntary and genuine
consent;
(ii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim
where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent;
(iii) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance
by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence;
(iv) Credibility, character or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim or
witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior or
subsequent conduct of a victim or witness.87
The SCSL judges were influenced by the International Criminal Court‟s (ICC‟s) Rule 70,
which uses the same language. The states negotiating the ICC‟s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence felt that it was a misnomer to refer to consent as a defence.88 Rather, „[d]ue to
the existence or exploitation of coercive circumstances, consent is vitiated or negated‟.89
This is why the Rule explains when consent cannot be inferred, as opposed to when
consent may not be a defence. Note, however, that the SCSL judges did not reproduce the
subsequent ICC Rule 71, which mirrors the final part of the ICTR‟s Rule 96 and
explicitly states: „a Chamber shall not admit evidence of the prior or subsequent sexual
conduct of a victim or witness‟. It is not clear why the SCSL did not adopt such a Rule or
sub-Rule when it revised Rule 96. The SCSL‟s approach was therefore simultaneously
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wider than that of the ICTR – in including subsequent sexual conduct – and narrower – in
not prohibiting evidence of prior sexual conduct.
On the one hand, the inclusion of subsequent sexual conduct in the SCSL‟s version of
Rule 96 was particularly helpful in the case of Sierra Leone, in which a number of girls
and women forced to become so-called „bush wives‟ remained with their „husbands‟ out
of lack of alternatives due to stigmatization.90 The rule prevented a negative inference
based on the victim‟s continued sexual relations with her captor – which was directly
recognized by Justice Doherty in her dissent in the Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and
Kanu trial judgment.91 On the other hand, the SCSL rule lacks a prohibition and opened
up the possibility of victims being questioned about prior or subsequent sexual conduct
(even if it does not affect credibility), which is contrary to the protective antidiscriminatory intent that informs the ICTR rule. However, as in the ICTR, the Rule itself
seemed to be uncontroversial, and applied with implicit understanding, rather than
through explicit invocation.
The ICTR‟s legacy on evidentiary approaches to reduce retraumatization of victims of
sexual and gender-based violence can certainly be seen in the subsequent practice of the
SCSL, particularly in the use of written statements through Rule 92bis and use of
evidence from sources other than direct victims.
4. Conclusion
This paper has outlined a number of procedural protective and supportive rules and
actions that have assisted victims of sexual and gender-based violence in feeling secure
enough to provide their testimony to the ICTR and SCSL. However, there have been
some missteps and challenges in both tribunals. For example, victims of this type of
violence have not always felt supported in the courtroom, both in the ICTR and SCSL.92
In the ICTR, in multi-accused cases, some victims felt harassed by unnecessarily
repetitive and aggressive cross-examination about the details of the sexual violence they
suffered.93 In the SCSL, the rules discussed above did not prevent a majority of trial
judges in one case from adopting inappropriate and outdated reasoning that evidence of
gender-based crimes is much more likely to impugn the reputation of the accused than
any other kind of evidence.94
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That said, there are many positive aspects of ICTR procedural legacy, like the use of
written statements, prior transcripts and judicial notice in the Karemera et al. case to
reduce the need for exposing all rape witnesses to examination and cross-examination.
These procedural steps provided helpful precedent to the SCSL, which was originally
reliant on the ICTR‟s experiences to provide guidance. Thus the legacy of the ICTR on
procedure in cases involving sexual and gender-based violence extends outwards beyond
itself, and will continue to have resonance in the future.

